Abstract. Fault attacks exploit hardware malfunctions to recover secrets from embedded electronic devices. In the late 90's, Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton [6] introduced fault-based attacks on crt-rsa. These attacks factor the signer's modulus when the message padding function is deterministic. However, the attack does not apply when the message is partially unknown, for example when messages contain some randomness which is recovered only when verifying a correct signature. In this paper we successfully extends rsa fault attacks to a large class of partially known message configurations. The new attacks rely on Coppersmith's algorithm for finding small roots of multivariate polynomial equations. We illustrate the approach by successfully attacking several randomized versions of the iso/iec 9796-2 encoding standard. Practical experiments show that a 2048-bit modulus can be factored in less than a minute given one faulty signature containing 160 random bits and an unknown 160-bit message digest.
Introduction

Background
rsa [21] is undoubtedly the most common digital signature scheme used in embedded security tokens. To sign a message m with rsa, the signer applies an encoding (padding) function µ to m, and then computes the signature σ = µ(m) d mod N . To verify the signature, the receiver checks that σ e = µ(m) mod N.
As shown by Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton [6] and others (e.g. [17] ), rsa implementations can be vulnerable to fault attacks, especially when the Chinese Remainder Theorem (crt) is used; in this case the device computes σ p = µ(m) d mod p , σ q = µ(m) d mod q and the signature σ is computed from σ p and σ q by Chinese Remaindering.
⋆ An extended abstract of this paper will appear at ches 2009. This is the full version.
Assuming that the attacker is able to induce a fault when σ q is computed while keeping the computation of σ p correct, one gets
and the resulting (faulty) signature σ satisfies σ e = µ(m) mod p , σ e = µ(m) mod q .
Therefore, given one faulty σ, the attacker can factor N by computing gcd(σ e − µ(m) mod N, N ) = p .
Boneh et al.'s fault attack is easily extended to any deterministic rsa encoding, e.g. the Full Domain Hash (fdh) [5] encoding where σ = H(m) d mod N and H : {0, 1} * → Z N is a hash function. The attack is also applicable to probabilistic signature schemes where the randomizer used to generate the signature is sent along with the signature, e.g. as in the Probabilistic Full Domain Hash (pfdh) encoding [10] where the signature is σ r with σ = H(m r) d mod N . In that case, given the faulty value of σ and knowing r, the attacker can still factor N by computing gcd(σ e − H(m r) mod N, N ) = p.
Partially-Known Messages: The Fault-Attacker's Deadlock
However, if the message is not entirely given to the opponent the attack is thwarted, e.g. this may occur when the signature has the form σ = (m r) d mod N where r is a random nonce. Here the verifier can recover r only after completing the verification process; however r can only be recovered when verifying a correct signature. Given a faulty signature, the attacker cannot retrieve r nor infer (m r) which would be necessary to compute gcd(σ e − (m r) mod N, N ) = p.
In other words, the attacker faces an apparent deadlock: recovering the r used in the faulty signature σ seems to require that σ is a correctly verifiable signature. Yet, obviously, a correct signature does not factor N . These conflicting constraints cannot be conciliated unless r is short enough to be guessed by exhaustive search. Inducing faults in many signatures does not help either since different r values are used in successive signatures (even if m remains invariant). As a result, randomized rsa encoding schemes are usually considered to be inherently immune against fault attacks.
The New Result
We overcome this apparent deadlock by showing how to extract in some cases the unknown message part (ump) involved in the generation of faulty rsa signatures. We develop several techniques that extend Boneh et al.'s attack to a large class of partially known message configurations. We nonetheless assume that certain conditions on the unknown parts of the encoded message are met; these conditions may depend on the encoding function itself and on the hash functions used. To illustrate our attacks, we have chosen to consider the iso/iec 9796-2 standard [15] . iso/iec 9796-2 is originally a deterministic encoding scheme often used in combination with message randomization (e.g. in emv [12] ). The encoded message has the form:
is split into two parts. We show that if the unknown part of m [1] is not too large (e.g. less than 160 bits for a 2048-bit rsa modulus), then a single faulty signature allows to factor N as in [6] 1 . The new method is based on a result by Herrmann and May [11] for finding small roots of linear equations modulo an unknown factor p of N ; [11] is itself based on Coppersmith's technique [7] for finding small roots of polynomial equations using the lll algorithm [19] . We also show how to extend our attack to multiple umps and to scenarii where more faulty signatures can be obtained from the device. It is trivially seen that other deterministic signature encoding functions such as pkcs#1 v1.5 can be broken by the new attack even when the message digest is unknown. We elaborate on this in further detail at the end of the paper.
The iso/iec 9796-2 Standard
iso/iec 9796-2 is an encoding standard allowing partial or total message recovery [15, 16] . The encoding can be used with hash functions H(m) of diverse digest sizes k h . For the sake of simplicity we assume that k h , the size of m and the size of N (denoted k) are all multiples of 8. The iso/iec 9796-2 encoding of a message
where m [1] consists of the k − k h − 16 leftmost bits of m and m [2] represents the remaining bits of m. Therefore the size of µ(m) is always k − 1 bits. Note that the original version of the standard recommended 128 ≤ k h ≤ 160 for partial message recovery (see [15] , §5, note 4). In [8] , Coron, Naccache and Stern introduced an attack against iso/iec 9796-2; the authors estimated that attacking k h = 128 and k h = 160 would require respectively 2 54 and 2 61 operations. After Coron et al.'s publication, iso/iec 9796-2 was amended and the current official requirement (see [16] ) is now k h ≥ 160. In a recent work Coron, Naccache, Tibouchi and Weinmann successfully attack the currently valid version of iso/iec 9796-2 [9] .
To illustrate our purpose, we consider a message m = m[1] m [2] of the form
where r is a message part unknown to the adversary, α and α ′ are strings known to the adversary and data is some known or unknown string 2 . The size of r is denoted k r and the size of m [1] is k − k h − 16 as required in iso/iec 9796-2. The encoded message is then
Therefore the total number of unknown bits in µ(m) is k r + k h .
1 In our attack, it does not matter how large the unknown part of m [2] is. 2 The attack will work equally well in both cases.
2 Fault Attack on Partially-Known Message iso/iec 9796-2
This section extends [6] to signatures of partially known messages encoded as described previously. We assume that after injecting a fault the opponent is in possession of a faulty signature σ such that:
From (2) we can write
where t is a known value. Note that both r and H(m) are unknown to the adversary. From (3) we obtain:
This shows that (r, H(m)) must be a solution of the equation
where a := t − σ e mod N , b := 2 nr and c := 2 8 are known. Therefore we are left with solving equation (5) which is linear in the two variables x, y and admits a small root (x 0 , y 0 ) = (r, H(m)). However the equation holds modulo an unknown divisor p of N and not modulo N . Such equations were already exploited by Herrmann and May [11] to factor an rsa modulus N = pq when some blocks of p are known. Their method is based on Coppersmith's technique for finding small roots of polynomial equations [7] . Coppersmith's technique uses lll to obtain two polynomials h 1 (x, y) and h 2 (x, y) such that
holds over the integers. Then one computes the resultant between h 1 and h 2 to recover the common root (x 0 , y 0 ). To that end, we must assume that h 1 and h 2 are algebraically independent. This ad hoc assumption makes the method heuristic; nonetheless it turns out to work quite well in practice. Then, given the root (x 0 , y 0 ) one recovers the randomized encoded message µ(m) and factors N by gcd.
Theorem 1 (Herrmann-May [11] ). Let N be a sufficiently large composite integer with a divisor p ≥ N β . Let f (x, y) = a+b·x+c·y ∈ Z[x, y] be a bivariate linear polynomial. Assume that f (x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 mod p for some (x 0 , y 0 ) such that |x 0 | ≤ N γ and |y 0 | ≤ N δ . Then for any ε > 0, under the condition
We only sketch the proof and refer the reader to [11] for more details. Assume that b = 1 in the polynomial f (otherwise multiply f by b −1 mod N ) and consider the polynomial
We look for (x 0 , y 0 ) such that f (x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 mod p. The basic idea consists in generating a family G of polynomials admitting (x 0 , y 0 ) as a root modulo p t for some large enough integer t. Any linear combination of these polynomials will also be a polynomial admitting (x 0 , y 0 ) as a root modulo p t . We will use lll to find such polynomials with small coefficients. To do so, we view any polynomial
and denote by h(xX, yY ) this vector's Euclidean norm. Performing linear combinations on polynomials is equivalent to performing linear operations on their vectorial representation, so that applying lll to the lattice spanned by the vectors in G will provide short vectors representing polynomials with root (x 0 , y 0 ) mod p t .
We now define the family G of polynomials as
We first sort the polynomials g k,i by increasing k values and then by increasing i values. Denoting X = N γ and Y = N δ , we write the coefficients of the polynomial g k,i (xX, yY ) in the basis
This results in the matrix of row vectors illustrated in Figure 1 . Let
Lattice of row vectors formed by the coefficients of the polynomials g k,i (xX, yY ). The matrix is lower triangular; we only represent the diagonal elements.
L be the corresponding lattice; L's dimension is
and we have det
and
We now apply lll to the lattice L to find two polynomials h 1 (x, y) and h 2 (x, y) with small coefficients.
Theorem 2 (LLL [19] ). Let L be a lattice spanned by (u 1 , . . . , u ω ). Given the vectors (u 1 , . . . , u ω ), the lll algorithm finds in polynomial time two linearly independent vectors b 1 , b 2 such that
Therefore using lll we can get two polynomials h 1 (x, y) and h 2 (x, y) such that
Using Howgrave-Graham's lemma (below), we can determine the required bound on the norms of h 1 and h 2 to ensure that (x 0 , y 0 ) is a root of both h 1 and h 2 over the integers:
Lemma 1 (Howgrave-Graham [13] ). Assume that h(x, y) ∈ Z[x, y] is a sum of at most ω monomials and assume further that h(x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 mod B where |x 0 | ≤ X and |y 0 | ≤ Y and h(xX, yY ) < B/ √ ω.
Then h(x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 holds over the integers.
Proof. We have
Since h(x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 mod B, this implies that h(x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 over the integers.
⊓ ⊔
We apply Lemma 1 with B := p t . Using (7) this gives the condition:
[11] shows that by letting t = τ · m with τ = 1 − √ 1 − β, we get the condition:
Therefore we obtain as in [11] the following condition for m:
Since lll runs in time polynomial in the lattice's dimension and coefficients, the running time is polynomial in log N and 1/ε.
Discussion
For a balanced rsa modulus (β = 1/2) we get the condition:
This means that for a 1024-bit rsa modulus N , the total size of the unknowns x 0 and y 0 can be at most 212 bits. Applied to our context, this implies that for iso/iec 9796-2 with k h = 160, the size of the ump r can be as large as 52 bits. Section 3 reports practical experiments confirming this prediction.
In Appendix A we provide a Python code for computing the bound on the size of the unknown values (k r + k h ) as a function of the modulus size.
In the next paragraph we extend the method to 1) several disjoint ump blocks in the encoding function, 2) to two dissimilar faults (one modulo p and one modulo q) and 3) to two or more faults modulo the same prime factor.
Extension to Several Unknown Bits Blocks
Assume that the ump used in iso/iec 9796-2 is split into n different blocks, namely
where the umps r 1 , . . . , r n are all part of the message m. The α i blocks are known. We use the extended result of Herrmann and May [11] , allowing to (heuristically) find the solutions (y 1 , . . . , y n ) of a linear equation modulo a factor p of N :
For β = 1/2 and for a large number of blocks n, one gets the bound
This shows that if the total number of unknown bits plus the message digest is less than 15.3% of the size of N , then the umps can be fully recovered from the faulty signature and Boneh et al.'s attack will apply again. However the number of blocks cannot be too large because the attack's runtime increases exponentially with n.
Extension to Two Faults Modulo Different Factors
Assume that we can get two faulty signatures, one incorrect modulo p and the other incorrect modulo q. This gives the two equations
where the coefficients α 0 , . . . , α 8 are known and the unknowns z 1 , . . . , z 8 are small. Using lll again, we can recover the z i 's (and then x 0 , x 1 , y 0 , y 1 ) as long as the cumulated size of the z i 's is at most the size of N . This yields the condition 6 · (k r + k h ) ≤ k which, using the notation of Theorem 1, can be reformulated as
This remains weaker than condition (9) . However the attack is significantly faster because it works over a lattice of constant dimension 9. Moreover, the 16.7% bound is likely to lend itself to further improvements using Coppersmith's technique instead of plain linearization.
Extension to Several Faults Modulo the Same Factor
To exploit single faults, we have shown how to use lattice-based techniques to recover p given N and a bivariate linear equation f (x, y) admitting a small root (x 0 , y 0 ) modulo p. In this context, we have used Theorem 1 which is based on approximate gcd techniques from [14] . In the present section we would like to generalize this to use ℓ different polynomials of the same form, each having a small root modulo p. More precisely, let ℓ be a fixed parameter and assume that as the result of ℓ successive faults, we are given ℓ different polynomials
where each polynomial f u has a small root (ξ u , ν u ) modulo p with |ξ u | ≤ X and |ν u | ≤ Y . Note that, as in the basic case, we re-normalized each polynomial f u to ensure that the coefficient of x u in f u is equal to one. To avoid double subscripts, we hereafter use the Greek letters ξ and ν to represent the root values. We would like to use a lattice approach to construct new multivariate polynomials in the variables (x 1 , · · · , x ℓ , y 1 , · · · , y ℓ ) with the root R = (ξ 1 , · · · , ξ ℓ , ν 1 , · · · , ν ℓ ). To that end we fix two parameters m and t and build a lattice on a family of polynomials G of degree at most m with root R modulo B = p t . This family is composed of all polynomials of the form
where each i u , j u is non-negative, i = ℓ u=1 i u , j = ℓ u=1 j u and 0 ≤ i + j ≤ m. Once again, let L be the corresponding lattice. Its dimension ω is equal to the number of monomials of degree at most m in 2ℓ unknowns, i.e. ω = m + 2ℓ 2ℓ .
Since we have a common upper bound X for all values |ξ u | and a common bound for all |ν u | we can compute the lattice's determinant as
where s x is the sum of the exponents of all unknowns x u in all occurring monomials, s y is the sum of the exponents of the y u and s N is the sum of the exponents of N in all occurring polynomials. For obvious symmetry reasons, we have s x = s y and noting that the number of polynomials of degree exactly d in ℓ unknowns is
we find
Likewise, summing on polynomials with a non-zero exponent v for N , where the sum of the j u is t − v we obtain
where 3 F 2 is the generalized hypergeometric function. As usual, assuming that p = N β we can find a polynomial with the correct root over the integers under the condition of formula (8).
Concrete Bounds: Using the notation of Theorem 1, we compute effective bounds on γ + δ = log(XY )/ log(N ) from the logarithm of condition (8), dropping the terms √ ω and 2 ω/4 which become negligible as N grows. For concrete values of N , bounds are slightly smaller. Dividing by log(N ), we find
Thus, given k, t and m, we can achieve at best
We have computed the achievable values of γ + δ for β = 1/2, for various parameters and for lattice dimensions 10 ≤ ω ≤ 1001. Results are given in Table 4 , Appendix B.
Recovering the Root: With 2ℓ unknowns instead of two, applying usual heuristics and hoping that lattice reduction directly outputs 2ℓ algebraically independent polynomials with the prescribed root over the integers becomes a wishful hope. Luckily, a milder heuristic assumption suffices to make the attack work. The idea is to start with K equations instead of ℓ and iterate the lattice reduction attack for several subsets of ℓ equations chosen amongst the K available equations. Potentially, we can perform K ℓ such lattice reductions. Clearly, since each equation involves a different subset of unknowns, they are all different. Note that this does not suffice to guarantee algebraic independence; in particular, if we generate more than K equations they cannot be algebraically independent. However, we only need to ascertain that the root R can be extracted from the available set of equations. This can be done, using Gröbner basis techniques, under the heuristic assumption that the set of equations spans a multivariate ideal of dimension zero i.e. that the number of solutions is finite.
Note that we need to choose reasonably small values of ℓ and K to be able to use this approach in practice. Indeed, the lattice that we consider should not become too large and, in addition, it should be possible to solve the resulting system of equations using either resultants or Buchberger's algorithm which means that neither the degree nor the number of unknowns should increase too much.
Asymptotic Bounds: Despite the fact that we cannot hope to run the multi-polynomial variant of our attack when parameters become too large, it is interesting to determine the theoretical limit of the achievable value of γ + δ as the number of faults ℓ increases. To that end, we assume as previously that β = 1/2, let t = τ m and replace ω, s x and s N by the following approximations:
For small ℓ values we provide in Table 1 the corresponding bounds on γ +δ. Although we do not provide further details here due to lack of space, one can show that the bound γ + δ tends to 1/2 as the number of faults ℓ tends to infinity and that all γ + δ values are algebraic numbers. Table 1 . Bound for the relative size γ + δ of the unknowns as a function of the number of faults ℓ.
Simulation Results
Assuming that fault injection can be performed on unprotected devices (see Section 4), we simulated the attack. In the experiment we generated faulty signatures (using the factors p and q) and applied to them the attack's mathematical analysis developed in the previous sections to factor N . We refer the reader to Section 4 for more on physical fault injection experiments.
Single-Fault Attack Simulations
We first consider a single-ump, single-fault attack when H = sha-1 i.e. k h = 160. Using the sage library lll implementation, computations were executed on a 2ghz Intel notebook. modulus size k ump size k r m t lattice dimension ω runtime 1024  6  10  3  66  4 minutes  1024  13  13  4  105  51 minutes  1536  70  8  2  45  39 seconds  1536  90  10  3  66  9 minutes  2048  158  8  2  45  55 seconds   Table 2 . Single fault, single ump 160-bit digests (k h = 160). lll runtime for different parameter combinations.
Experimental results are summarized in Table 2 . We see that for 1024-bit rsa, the randomizer size k r must be quite small and the attack is less efficient than exhaustive search 3 . However for larger moduli, the attack becomes more efficient. Typically, using a single fault and a 158-bit ump, a 2048-bit rsa modulus was factored in less than a minute.
Multiple-Fault Simulations
To test the practicality of the approach presented in Section 2.4, we have set (ℓ, t, m) = (3, 1, 3) i.e. three faulty signatures. This leads to a lattice of dimension 84 and a bound γ + δ ≤ 0.204. Experiments were carried out with 1024, 1536 and 2048 bit rsa moduli. This implementation also relied on the sage library [20] running on a single pc. Quite surprisingly, we observed a very large number of polynomials with the expected root over the integers. The test was run for three random instances corresponding to the parameters in Table 3 . 1024  40  49 seconds  1536  150  74 seconds  2048  250 111 seconds   Table 3 . Three faults, single ump, 160-bit digests (k h = 160). lll runtime for different parameter combinations.
For each parameter set, the first 71 vectors in the reduced lattice have the expected root. In fact, it is even possible to solve the system of equations without resorting to Buchberger's algorithm. Instead, we use a much simpler strategy. We first consider the system modulo a prime p ′ above 2 160 (or above 2 250 in the 2048-bit experiment). With this system, linearization suffices to obtain through echelonization the polynomials x i − ξ i and y i − ν i . Since p ′ is larger than the bounds on the values, this yields the exact values of ξ 1 , ξ 2 , ξ 3 , ν 1 , ν 2 and ν 3 . Once this is done, the factors of N are easily recovered by computing the gcd of N with any of the values f i (ξ i , ν i ).
Three faults turn-out to be more efficient than single-fault attacks (Table 3 vs. Table 2 ). In particular for a 1024-bit rsa modulus, the three-fault attack recovered a 40-bit ump r in 49 seconds 4 , whereas the single-fault attack only recovered a 13-bit ump in 51 minutes.
Physical Fault Injection Experiments
We performed fault injection on an unprotected device to demonstrate the entire attack flow. We obtain a faulty signature from a general-purpose 8-bit microcontroller running an rsa implementation and factor N using the mathematical attack of Section 2.
Our target device was an Atmel ATmega128 [3] , a very pupular risc microcontroller (µc) with an 8-bit avr core. The µc was running an rsa-crt implementation developed in C using the BigDigits multiple-precision arithmetic library [4] . The µc was clocked at 7.3728 mhz using a quartz crystal and powered from a 5V source.
We induced faults using voltage spikes (cf. to [1] and [2] for more information on such attacks on similar µcs). Namely, we caused brief power cut-offs (spikes) by grounding the chip's V cc input for short time periods. Spikes were produced by an fpga-based board counting the µc's clock transitions and generating the spike at a precise moment. The cut-off duration was variable with 10ns granularity and the spike's temporal position could be fine-tuned with the same granularity. The fault was heuristically positioned to obtain the stable fault injection in one of the rsa-crt branches (computing σ p or σ q ). A 40ns spike is presented in Figure 2 . Longer spike durations caused a µc's reset. 
Conclusion
The paper introduced a new breed of partially-known message fault attacks against rsa signatures. These attacks allow to factor the modulus N given a single faulty signature. Although the attack is heuristic, it works well in practice and paradoxically becomes more efficient as the modulus size increases. As several faulty signatures are given longer umps and longer digests become vulnerable.
The new techniques are more generally applicable to any context where the signed messages are partially unknown, in which case we provide explicit size conditions for the fault attack to apply. This has a direct impact on other encoding functions, such as pkcs#1 v1.5 standard where a message m is encoded as µ(m) = 0001 16 FF 16 . . . FF 16
where T is a known sequence of bytes which encodes the identifier of the hash function and k 1 is a size parameter which is adjusted to make µ(m) have the same number of bytes than the modulus. With a single unknown bounded by N δ the condition is δ < 0.25. Therefore assuming a 2048-bit modulus and H = sha-512, we obtain that the modulus can be efficiently factored using a single faulty signature σ even when the signed message is totally unknown. This enables fault attacks in complex cryptographic scenarii where e.g. a smart-card and a terminal exchanging rsa signatures on encrypted messages.
A Root Size Estimation
from math import log,sqrt def LatticeExpo(t,m): sy=sx=sn=w=0 for k in range(m+1): for i in range(m-k+1): j=max(t-k,0) sy+=i; sx+=k; sn+=j; w+=1 return (sx,sy,sn,w) def bound(t,m,n):
(sx,sy,sn,w)=LatticeExpo(t,m) nxy=(w*(n*t*.5-.25*w-log(sqrt(w),2))-n*sn)/sx return nxy,w B Achievable Bound on γ + δ
We provide in Table 4 the achievable bound on γ + δ, as a function of the number of faults ℓ and parameters (t, m). 
C Example of a Faulty Signature
